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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
EXCISE TAx-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF STATE TO
TAx INCOME FROM CoPYRIGHT.-Plaintiff, a domestic business cor-
poration, derived its income solely from copyrights granted by the
United States on motion picture films. These copyrights were not
all held in the name of the plaintiff corporation, but the latter owned
and received the income from all the copyrights. The State, in de-
termining plaintiff's franchise tax, used the income derived from the
copyrights as a measure of the tax. Plaintiff sought to enjoin de-
fendant from collecting the tax on the ground that a direct tax on
incomes from copyrights may not be levied by the State. On appeal
from a decree dismissing the petition, Hetd, affirmed. This non-
discriminatory tax is not directly on income but is purely an excise.
The copyright income was merely a casual incident in the determina-
tion of the franchise tax which directly imposes no burden on the
federal government. Educational Films Corporation of America v.
Hamilton Ward, Atty.-Gen. of N. Y., 51 Sup. Ct. 170 (1931).
For a discussion of this case in the Court of Appeals, see (1930)
5 St. John's L. Rev. 138.
W. H. S.
INCOME TAx-BASIS FOR DETERMINATION OF GAIN.-Peti-
tioner, a manufacturer of metal castings, brought suit to recover in-
come and excess profits taxes assessed and paid for the year 1917.
Right to recover was asserted on the sole ground that a munitions
tax levied under the Revenue Act of 1916,1 which became due and
was paid by petitioner in 1917 was correctly deducted from gross in-
come in petitioner's tax returns for that year. Petitioner contends that
its returns were made as "cash receipts and disbursements" returns
under section 12 (a) and not under 13 (d), and that since by sec-
tion 12 (a) taxes are required to be deducted only in the year when
paid, its munitions tax was rightly deducted in the 1917 return.2
The Commissioner, rejecting this contention, deducted the tax from
gross income for 1916, the year when it accrued. and collected a
correspondingly increased income and profits tax for 1917, which
is involved in the present suit. On appeal from a decision in the
Circuit Court for the government, Held, affirmed. In computing
the Federal Income Tax the munitions manufacturer's tax for 1916
should have been deducted from 1916 income and not from 1917
income, although paid in the latter year, since the evidence indicated
the books and tax returns were made on the accrual basis. Aluminum
Casting Company v. Routzahn, 282 U. S. 92, 51 Sup. Ct. 11 (1930).
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the estab-
lished rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the
Revenue Act of 1916 (c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 780).
'Revenue Act of 1916 (c. 463, 39 Stat. 767, 771).
TAX COMMENT
clear import of the language used.3 In case of doubt, they are con-
strued most strongly against the government and in favor of the
taxpayer.4  However, it is clear that whether a return is made on
the accrual basis, or on that of actual receipts and disbursements, is
not determined by the label which the taxpayer chooses to place upon
it.5  This is in direct refutation of much of the early legislation 0
and decisions. 7  It has been pointed out that the Excise Tax Law
of 1909 and the Corporation Income Tax Law of 1913 contem-
plated an estimation on a "cash" as opposed to a "revenue" basis.8
There, since the returns included inventories and other departures
from the strict receipts and disbursements basis, it is evident that
the "accrual" method had not yet been recognized. 9 The difficulty
and the inexpedience of using the "cash" basis in the growing busi-
ness firms necessitated recognition of the "accrual" method of ac-
' U. S. v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 183, 44 Sup. Ct. 69, 68 L. ed. 240
(1923); U. S. v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 262, 41 Sup. Ct. 256, 65 L. ed. 617
(1920); Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 Sup. Ct. 53 62 L. ed. 211
(1917); Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 534, 42 Sup. Ct. 391, 66 L. ed.
747 (1922).
' Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings Bank,' 257 U. S. 602, 606, 42 Sup.
Ct. 223, 66 L. ed. 391 (1922); Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223, 233, 39
Sup. Ct. 270, 63 L. ed. 573 (1918); Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144, 156, 44
Sup. Ct. 462, 68 L. ed. 949 (1923); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
U. S. 339, 348, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 73 L. ed. 410 (1928).
'Niles Bement Pond Co. v. U. S., 281 U. S. 357, 360, 50 Sup. Ct. 251,
74 L. ed. 901 (1929); U. S. v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 442 443, 46 Sup. Ct.
131, 70 L. ed. 347 (1925); U. S. v. Mitchel, 271 U. S. 9, 12, 46 Sup Ct.
418, 70 L. ed. 799 (1925). These cases are authority for the proposition that
the use of inventories, and the inclusion in the returns of accrual items of
receipts and disbursements, indicate the general and controlling character
of the account.
'Corporation Excise Tax Law, 1909 (38 Stat. 112-117); Corporation
Income Tax Law, 1916 (c. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166).
Lumber Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Malley. 256 F. 380 (D. C., Mass.)
(1916); Maryland Casualty Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 342, 40 Sup. Ct. 155, 64
L. ed. 297 (1919); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Herold, (D. C., N. J.),
198 F. 199, aff'd 201 F. 918 (C. C. A., 3rd, 1913), cert. den. 34 Sup. Ct. 323
231 U. S. 755, 58 L. ed. 468 (1912).
'Lumber Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Malley (supra note 7): "Only
premiums actually received in cash can properly be regarded as income."
'In reference to Sec. 38, cl. 2 (36 Stat. 112-117), it is important to
note that in both the Maryland Casualty Co. case (supra note 7), and the
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. case (supra note 7), the language used by the
Court in U. S. v. Schillinger, 14 Blatchf. 71, Fed. Cas. No. 16228, Fed. A.
M. Tax Rep. 2126, is quoted with approval: "In the absence of any special
provision to the contrary, income must be taken to mean money, and not the
expectation of receiving it, or the right to receive it."
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
counting.'0 Beginning with U. S. v. Anderson," progress in the
development of the law was rapid, and the archaic rule of the Lumber
Mutual Fire Ins. case was disregarded for scientific principles of
accounting.12  The instant case serves notice that hybrid returns,
consisting of mixed items determined on both the "accrual" and the
"receipts and disbursements" basis will no longer be tolerated, and
that the law in this respect will henceforth be narrowly construed.
T. S. W.
INCOME TAX-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX ON PROFITS DE-
RIVED FROM SALE OF COUNTY BONDs.-Plaintiff purchased as an in-
vestment certain bonds issued by counties and municipalities of
Minnesota in 1919. In January, 1924, he realized a profit of $736.26,
through their sale, paid an income tax on such, under protest, and
claimed a refund, which he seeks to recover charging the Revenue
Act of 1924,1 as void since it taxes a government instrumentality.
The claim was rejected, demurrer to the complaint was overruled,
judgment entered for the plaintiff, and affirmed by the Circuit Court.2
On appeal, judgment reversed, Held, tax is not upon obligations of
a state, or any political subdivision; but is upon profits realized upon
the sale of such obligations. As a practical consequence there is no
basis for the conclusion that the borrowing power of the states are
adversely affected, nor can sale by private individuals in any way be
"Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure (1925) p. 497: "Nothing can
be more obvious than the proposition that true net income cannot be deter-
mined by looking over one's cash account." See also Holmes, Federal In-
come Tax (1917) pp. 299-301. Of interest is the Report of the Committee
on Ways and Means (House Report No. 992, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4)
with reference to the income tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916: "As
two systems of bookkeeping are in use in the United States, one based on
the cash or receipt basis and the other on the accrual basis, it was deemed
advisable to provide in the proposed measure that an individual or corporation
may make return of income on either the cash or accrued basis, if the basis
selected clearly reflects the income."
I U. S. v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 442, 443, 46 Sup. Ct. 131, 70 L. ed. 347
(1925). Justice Stone turns our attention to "a consideration of the difficul-
ties involved in the preparation of an income account on a strict basis of
receipts and disbursements for a business of any complexity." In this case
we have recognized for the first time the principle that while the first problem
in income taxation is to define income, the second and equally important
problem is to allocate income in respect to time; and furthermore, that in-
come is said to be accrued when it is definitely receivable, although i6
payment may not be due. (See also note 10.)
' W. S. Barstow & Co. v. Bowers, 15 F. (2nd) 75 (D. C.. N. Y.)
(1926); Becker v. U. S., 21 F. (2nd) 1003 (C. C. A., Ga.) (1927); R. P.
Hyams Coal Co. v. U. S., 26 F. (2nd) 805 (D. C., La.) (1928); Weed &
Bros. v. U. S., 38 F. (2nd) 935, 51 Sup. Ct. 25 (1930).
'43 Stat. 253 (1924). U. S. C. A. Tit. 26, Sec. 954 (1926).
' 35 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A., 8th, 1929).
